Abstract
Critics have long claimed that when the law regulates police behavior it
inadvertently reduces officer aggressiveness, thereby increasing crime. This
hypothesis has taken on new significance in recent years as prominent
politicians and law enforcement leaders have argued that increased oversight of
police officers in the wake of the events in Ferguson, Missouri has led to an
increase in national crime rates. Using a panel of American law enforcement
agencies and difference-in-difference regression analyses, this Article tests
whether the introduction of public scrutiny or external regulation is
associated with changes in crime rates. To do this, this Article relies on an
original dataset of all police departments that have been subject to federally
mandated reform under 42 U.S.C. § 14141—the most invasive form of modem
American police regulation. This Article finds that the introduction of § 14141
regulation was associated with a statistically significant uptick in some crime
rates, relative to unaffected municipalities. This uptick in crime was
concentrated in the years immediately after federal intervention and diminished
over time. This finding suggests that police departments may experience growing
pains when faced with external regulation.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Cornell Law Review |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| State | Published - 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Stephen Rushin & Griffin Sims Edwards, De-Policing, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 721 (2017).Keywords
- policing
- crime
- police misconduct
- civil rights
- de-policing
- Ferguson effect
Disciplines
- Law Enforcement and Corrections
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